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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN RUSSIA: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 1996 RUSSIAN COMPANY
LAW
Gregory Wolk
Abstract: During Post-Soviet privatization, widespread abuses of power in Russian
corporations contributed to the economic malaise in that country. These abuses are
attributed to the domination of firms by senior management. In January 1996, the
Russian Company Law went into effect with very strong protections for minority
shareholders as a means to curb these abuses. This Comment analyzes the effectiveness
of the Russian Company Law in this regard over the past three years. It concludes that
the law has been moderately successful given the extremely hostile conditions at the time
of enactment, and thus, it is a model for other transitional economies in need of corporate
governance reform.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the Russian government enacted a statute designed to reform
control over Russian joint stock companies.' The vast majority of these
companies were state-owned firms that had undergone the privatization
process. 2 Once privatization was nearly complete, senior management had
gained control over most firms.3 Unfortunately, senior management in most
instances refused to share control with employees and outside minority
shareholders.4 This domination led to great abuses of power: gross
mismanagement and even theft of corporate assets; a disregard for employee
welfare; and the prevention of much needed outside investment in order to
See Ob Aktsionemykh Obshchestvakh RF [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Joint-Stock
Companies], RF Federal Act No. 208-FZ, Dec. 26, 1995, translated in RUSSIAN ECONOMIC LAWS,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rflaw File [hereinafter Russian Company Law]. For a detailed and
comprehensive discussion of the Russian Company Law see BERNARD BLACK ET AL., GUIDE TO THE
RUSSIAN LAW ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (1998).
2 The privatization process, which began in 1992, allowed Russian citizens to become partial
owners in most of the formerly government owned enterprises. These privatized enterprises are now joint
stock companies. Individuals and entities own a percentage of a company to the extent they possess a
portion of a company's shares. See JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., KREMLIN CAPITALISM: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 39-41 (1997).
3 Most empirical studies in the mid-1990s found that management controlled about two-thirds of all
privatized firms. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
4 If a majority of the stock in the company is owned by management and/or employees, the
company is said to be "insider controlled." If an outside investor owns a small percentage of shares in an
insider controlled company, the investor is a minority outsider. In fact, most of the Russian joint-stock
companies were owned (as opposed to controlled) primarily by rank-and-file employees as opposed to
management. See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
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retain control. 5 This irresponsible corporate governance delayed much
needed enterprise restructuring. 6 In response to these abuses and concerns
about the future, the Russian government promulgated the 1996 Joint-Stock
Company Law ("Company Law" or "the law").
The law, which was passed in December 1995, is a modified version
of a proposed law designed by two American corporate law professors,
Bernard Black and Reiner Kraakman. 8
The professors subsequently
published an article explaining the novel approach of the law. 9 Their first
claim is that "effective corporate law is context specific, even if the
problems it must address are universal."' ° Mere transplantation of corporate
law from developed economies to transition economies, they argue, will
prove to be ineffective given the differing characteristics and roles of key
participants in the corporate enterprise." Their other claim is that certain
cultural values and business practices must be considered when designing a
country's corporate law. 12 Black and Kraakman identify these contextual
factors within transition economies and advocate for the adoption of strong
protections for minority shareholders as a means to promote the goals of
corporate law in emerging market economies. The principal goal supported
by these protections is "[t]he efficiency goal of maximizing the company's
'1 3
value to investors."
The Russian Company Law offers many of the protections advocated in
the Black and Kraakman article.' 4 These protections include: 1) cumulative
voting by shareholders to elect the board of directors; 2) extensive procedural
protections for shareholders over the board; 3) a requirement for the use of
independent registrars; 4) disclosure of a company's financial records and
See infra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 147. Corporate governance refers to the mechanisms and
processes by which companies are governed.
THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS GROUP, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: WHO HOLDS THE REIGNS? 1 (1995). The authors state: "If the companies in which wealth
is accumulated are poorly governed, if their resources are inefficiently used, if their managements are inept
or if the power of their management becomes channeled in a way which conflicts with the company's
interests, all stakeholders [viz., shareholders with relatively large, though not necessarily controlling,
shareholdings] and society suffer, not just the owners of the enterprise. It is therefore important that within
every company there are means of ensuring that resources are used efficiently and in a manner that ensures
the achievement of the company's objectives and its ability to contribute to the common good." Id.
7 BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 98. See also Russian Company Law.
" Bernard Black & Reiner Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1911, 1914 n.2 (1996).
9 Id.
I ld. at 1914.
12 Id
id.
" Id. at 1921.
6

14 See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
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other relevant information; and 5) mandatory board and shareholder oversight
over classes of large-scale and self-interested transactions.15 Given its primary
emphasis on strong minority protections, the Russian Company Law reflects a
governance reform within the context of
definite commitment to corporate
16
emerging market economies.
Not surprisingly, the primary difficulties, which these protections have
had to overcome, are those same abuses of power that the Company Law
sought to reform. In fact, those who control certain companies demonstrate a
general disregard for laws that compromise their own interests. 17 Black and
Kraakman argue that their legal model is "self-enforcing" so that key
participants in the corporate enterprise, including those in control, will
voluntarily accept the law as the reasonable standard of corporate
governance.' 8 Those participants who egregiously violate the law will be
subject to harsh, and possibly violent, extra-judicial repercussions from,
paradoxically, the law-abiding participants. 19 The Company Law was
therefore novel in that it was designed primarily as a model for reasonable
corporate behavior and not as a tool for judicial enforcement.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the effectiveness of the
recently promulgated Russian Company Law on Russian business
practices. Effectiveness will generally be measured by an increase in the
recognition for, and the implementation of, minority shareholder rights.
Part II of this Comment assesses the extent to which minority shareholder
rights were recognized in Russia just prior to the enactment of the
Company Law. Part III examines the protections within the Company
Law's provisions with explanations and arguments supplemented from the
Black and Kraakman article. It then analyzes the extent to which minority
shareholder protections have been recognized and respected since the law
was passed and the factors that would tend to explain the extent of postpromulgation recognition and respect.

Is Black & Kraakman, supra note 8 at 1933-36. Large-scale transactions are company purchases or
dispositions involving a large portion of the company's assets. Self-interested transactions are company
purchases or dispositions with another entity or individual controlled by or related to one or more of the
company's directors or officers. See Russian Company Law arts. 78-79 & 81-83.
16 Although other emerging economies have company laws that seek to promote corporate
governance, the 1996 Russian Company Law earned the highest marks for setting extensive legal standards
for corporate governance. See John L. Taylor & Franqoise April, FosteringInvestment Law in Transitional
Economies: A Case for Refocusing Institutional Reform, 4 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 1, 23-24 (1997).
17 See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
lB Black & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1915.
9Id. at 1940-41.
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BACKGROUND TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1996 RUSSIAN FEDERATION
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY LAW

Prior to the enactment of the Russian Company Law, managerial
control over the majority of firms was the major reason for a general
disregard for minority shareholder rights. This insider ownership of the
majority of Russian firms was a direct consequence of the Russian
privatization process.2 ° Most managers were able to gain control in the
governing structure in these firms, which in turn allowed managers to
neatly align the goals of the firms with their own interests. 22 Many of these
managers were more concerned with stability and job security than the
dictates of the market.23 Without the necessary outsider input and oversight,
irresponsible corporate governance burgeoned in a country where there was
little experience to accommodate basic market forces.24
A.

Insider Control

The Russian privatization program led directly to insider ownership
over the majority of shares in almost all privatized firms. 25 It offered several
buy-out options to employees (both rank-and-file workers as well as
managers) of suitable enterprises. 6 The most common method known as
Option Two involved employees purchasing, during a period of extreme
20 Most of the surveys conducted on the ownership results from the privatization process estimated
insider shareholdings as a percentage of all shareholdings in privatized firms to be between 65% and 70%.
See Joseph Blasi & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Governance in Russia, in 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN

CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 78 (Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996). Their survey placed the figure at

65% as of December 1993. The survey had a relatively low sample size of 170 firms across several regions
in the country, but the firms (through management) were interviewed extensively and thus the survey
proved to be a rich source of material pertaining to corporate governance. See also John Earle & Saul
Estrin, After Voucher Privatization: The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Russian Manufacturing
Industry (June 2, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). They
determine that 66. 1% of privatized manufacturing firms were insider held. Their survey was conducted in
the summer of 1994, and although it only sampled manufacturing firms, the sample size was much larger
than any other sample conducted to date (439 firms). It also sampled firms that had not participated in
privatization and included samples from firms privatized through the lease option. See also Roman
Frydman et al., Investing in Insider-DominatedFirms: A Study of the Russian Voucher PrivatizationFunds,
in I CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 187 (Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996).

This survey estimates that as of June 1994, nearly 70% of privatized firms were insider dominated. The
survey was conducted through a sample of the voucher funds (148 funds out of 516).
21
22
23
24
25
26

BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 88. See also supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 122.

Id
id.

See supra note 20.

Some enterprises, most notably those with ties to the defense industry, were not allowed to
privatize during the early stages of privatization. See Earle & Estrin, supra note 20, at 32.
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inflation, fifty-one percent of the total shares at a price of 1.7 times the July
1992 book value of the company. 27 Because this purchasing frenzy took
place during a period of extreme inflation, the book value declined more
sharply than did the market value of the actual assets. 28 Thus, the majority
29
of a firm's shares were sold to employees at a greatly reduced rate. These
firms remained under insider control as employees, and especially
management, continued to buy more shares to consolidate their control.3 °
Under Option One, the state gave employees twenty-five percent of the
shares free of charge and then allowed the workers to purchase an additional
ten percent and managers an additional five percent at nominal prices. 3I The
number of companies that chose Option Three, which allowed for a
management buy-out based upon the fulfillment of a performance contract,
was almost negligible. 32 Finally, the lease buy-out option, Option Four,
gave insiders the greatest proportion of control.33 This program, from
January 1992 to the end of June 1994, distributed sixty-five to seventy
percent of the shares of some 14,000 firms to the employees of those firms
while only an average of eighteen percent of each firm's shares were offered
to the public. 34 These options effectively redistributed firms, and their
assets, from the state to the employees of the firms.
Thus, the privatization program, especially under Options Two and
Four, allowed managers to consolidate their control over the privatized
firms. Although employee-shareholders held most of the shares of these
firms, senior management held the largest blocks and consequently were
able to elect entire boards. 35 These results ran contrary to requirements
established by the Russian Federation State Committee for State Property
("GKI") that demanded one board seat for worker-shareholders out of five
27

Book value refers to the ruble value of the corporate assets as defined by governmental officials in

July 1992. MAXIM BOYCKO ET AL., PRIVATIZING RUSSIA 139-92 (1995).

In this initial analysis of the

privatization program in 1993, over 60% of the firms chose this option. Earle & Estrin, supra note 20, at
36 & n.36. The sample also suggests that about 60% chose Option Two.
28 Earle & Estrin, supra note 20, at 36 & n.36.
29 id.
30 id.

3 The average insider holdings amounted to just over 50% of all shares (some of these shares are not
voting shares). Earle & Estrin, supra note 20, at 36-41. The authors contend that once voting shares are
tabulated outsider control, as a percentage of all voting stock, rises considerably.
32 Id at 36.

33 The lease buy-out option was used by over 25% of the privatizing firms between 1993-95. These
firms averaged insider shareholdings as 90.6% of the total. Id at 18, 36.
34 See Frydman et al., supra note 20, at 190.
35 See Blasi & Shleifer, supra note 20, at 80. In fact, rank-and-file employees owned the majority of
all insider owned shares but were intimidated into either selling their shares to management or, at least,
allowing managers to vote their shares. See BLASI ETAL., supra note 2, at 107-108, 193. These employees
were also told that outsider shareholders would mean lay-offs. Id at 113.
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board members. 36 Moreover, further GKI requirements that limited the
number of managers on the board and imposed cumulative voting were
largely ignored.37 Therefore, management controlled not only the daily
operations of the companies, but the boards as well. 38 This manipulation
allowed senior management to exercise complete authority over most firms.
B.

Outsider Involvement

The architects of the privatization program had hoped for greater
outsider involvement. 3 9 The architects thought that the workers would take
their vouchers and cash them in on the huge premiums expected from the
mass giveaways. 40 These shares would then be consolidated among
managers and outsiders comprised of investment funds, foreign investors,
and domestic firms. 4 1 The managers would thus have a stake in the
continuing efficiency of the firm and outsiders would monitor against such
managerial opportunism such as voting themselves high salaries, stealing
corporate assets, and pursuing self-interested transactions.4 2 Outsiders, in an
attempt to create profit by cutting unneeded labor, would also push for
extensive restructuring of thousands of severely over-employed firms-a
legacy of the inefficient labor armies from the Soviet-era.
Unfortunately,
foreign and bank investment remained extremely low in the first few years
of the privatization process.44 Domestic firms were able to invest only
limited resources into other firms and the lack of available capital impaired
their ability to acquire substantial blocks of shares in many firms.45
36 Blasi & Shleifer, supra note 20, at 80-81.

7 Id. at 82. No more than one-third of the members of the board were to be employees. Cumulative
voting allows minority shareholders to consolidate their votes behind one candidate to the board. Instead of
voting for one individual, shareholders are allowed to distribute their votes among all the possible
candidates. Majority shareholders would then have to carefully balance their votes for several candidates
whereas minority shareholders could pool all their votes behind a friendly candidate. Normal voting allows
the majority shareholders to ensure that the entire slate of elected candidates is friendly to the board,
whereas cumulative voting allows minority shareholders to elect at least one candidate.
38 Id. at 89.
39 Frydman et al., supra note 20, at 189.
40 id

Id. Investment funds are entities whose sole purpose is to make a profit by investing in
companies' shares, corporate or governmental securities, or other assets. Id. at 191-92. These funds are
owned by numerous individual investors and managed by licensed investors. Id.
42 Id. at 189.
41 Id at 191. Observers agreed that firms should cut their employment
by half. See BLAS ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 36. See also Marta Bruno, The Business Culture in Russia, in BUSINESS CULTURES
IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 128, 146 (Milford Bateman ed., 1996).
44 Earle & Estrin, supra note 20, at 24.
41 Id. at Table 20. The average shareholding for domestic
firms among privatized, industrial
firms is 7.3%.
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The primary hope for outsider involvement lay in the voucher funds.
These funds were to act as mutual funds: individuals who own shares would
invest their vouchers in the fund, and the fund, in turn, would own the shares
of the various firms. 4 6 These funds would then either have a large enough
ownership stake to acquire voting rights, or at least enough information to
make informed investment decisions. However, these funds were not
47
allowed to acquire more than ten percent of the securities of one issuer. In
48
1994, this legal limit was raised to twenty-five percent and by the end of
that year voucher funds had acquired moderately significant blocks of shares
in many firms.49
The investment funds represented the primary means by which
Russian corporate governance could effect widespread, needed restructuring.
Investment funds that want to ensure a healthy profit have incentives to
become active in a firm, whereas managers who can skim profits and exact
favors have an incentive to maintain the status quo. Due to the illiquidity of
the Russian securities market during the end of privatization, analysts argued
that given a choice, a fund would rationally opt for a voice within the firm to
increase the health of its investment, rather than merely wait for the
opportunity to sell its shares. 50 In fact, funds were active in a large majority
of their investments. 51 However, their level of investment made these
52
actions less effective at controlling the influence of management.
Although other domestic firms owned a considerable portion of shares, there
were reports that many of these firms were supportive of management.
outside investors to
Thus, the investment funds were the most important
54
change.
effectuate
to
voice
alternative
an
provide
46 Frydman et al., supra note 20, at 191.
4' Id at 193 & n. 11. Cf Earle & Estrin, supra note 20, at 44 (arguing that this legal limit was ignored).
" Id. at 194.
49 Id. at 193 n.I I (of 148 funds, 76 owned stakes between 20% and 25%, 27 between 25% and 50%,
and four own stakes greater than 50%). Id. at 199 (funds held 20% or greater stakes in only 8.4% of the
6,882 companies in the sample funds' portfolios). But see Earle & Estrin, supra note 20, at 49 ("Only

about 15 percent of investment fund stakes are less than five per cent (but greater than zero), and 85 per
cent of their stakes are five per cent or greater!"). Id at 51 ("Thirty-three percent of all privatized firms
have institutional ownership at least at the 20 percent level, and 20.6 percent of firms have
ownership over 30 percent.").
50 The average percentage of the fund's companies traded was 24.9%. Of those traded,
traded in private trades. Frydman et al., supra note 20, at 225.
5' Funds were active in close to 80% of the companies in their portfolios. Id. at 212.
considered to be an "active investor" if it spends significant resources and/or effort on

institutional
88.6% were
"A fund is
monitoring

and/or influencing major decisions, such as employment, investment, structure of production, sales,
organization, etc." Id.
52 Id at 208.
Id. at210.
54 id.
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Even though most funds were active in the companies in which they
had invested, in many cases management had no outside, profit-driven rival
in the corporate structure. 55 This was reflected in the quality of the financial
information disclosed to the funds by their firms as well as the need to get
support from management to be on the board.56 Even if an outside director
was elected to the board, management would have the necessary quorum to
convene meetings at any time without the presence of outsider directors. 57
Management would, at times, not allow funds to increase their investment in
the company, 58 while at other times they would not tell investors about
shareholder meetings. If that did not work, management would resort to
locking investors out of the meeting. 9 If outside investors could get their
hands on enough shares to make demands on managers, managers would
simply issue new shares at nominal prices to themselves, thereby diluting
outside ownership. 60 Indeed, managers were the big winners from the
privatization program and they acted like it.
III.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RUSSIAN COMPANY LAW

A.

Shareholder Rights under the Russian Company Law and the SelfEnforcing Model

Passed in December 1995, the Federal Law of the Russian Federation
on Joint-Stock Companies defines the legal rights and obligations of all joint
stock companies operating in the Russian Federation. 6 1 The law enumerates
the procedures and requirements for creating, maintaining, and dissolving a
joint-stock company.62 Along with introducing many technical changes, the
law fills in gaps left by previous legislation and incorporates many legal
concepts derived from more mature western commercial law systems, some
" The state still had a large number of shares in many privatized firms. Id at 208 (finding that the
state was represented on the board in 46.9% of the firms in the funds' portfolios). Earle & Estrin, supra
note 20, at 29 (finding that the state held an average 15% in privatized firms). Blasi & Shleifer, supra note
20, at 94 (finding the average state shareholdings was 10% in December 1994).
56 Frydman et al., supra note 20, at 205, 216.
A third of sampled funds reported that the information
they got, if they were to get any, would be poor. Only 0.8% reported that they received good information,
whereas 82.7% of funds reported that they cooperated with management to obtain board representation.
57 Blasi & Shleifer, supra note 20,
at 89, 99.
58 27.8% of funds found that management refused to register an increase in the fund's ownership of

the firm on the share registry. Id at 226-27.

'9 See, e.g., Steve Liesman, Roiling Stock: Shareholder Meetings in Russia Set Stage for Free
Market Fight, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 20, 1995.
60 See e.g., BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 92-96.
61 See Russian Company
Law.
62 Id.
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of which were previously unknown in Russia. 63 The law more clearly
64
It
enumerates the powers and duties of company directors and officers.
65
for
importantly,
Most
shares.
preferred
of
classes
of
authorizes a variety
the purposes of this Comment, the law significantly strengthens
shareholders' rights, particularly for minority shareholders, and shareholder
participation in the governance of the company.
The Russian Company Law mandates a greater recognition of, and
respect for, shareholder rights and protections. For example, it clarifies
certain rights provided for in earlier laws. 66 It also establishes a more
sophisticated legal framework for the rights of shareholders who are absent
67
Such
from shareholder meetings or vote against certain decisions.
at
the
company
by
the
be
bought
shares
that
their
demand
shareholders may
of
the
the
reorganization
made
regarding
is
fair market value if a decision
of
the
an
amendment
or
transaction,
major
into
a
company, the entering
company charter which would be detrimental to those shareholders. 68 It is
the company's responsibility to inform shareholders of this right.69
Shareholders have greater control over board elections, large-scale
Cumulative voting is
transactions, and the issuance of new shares.
mandatory for elections to the board of directors in companies with more
This requirement enables minority
than 1,000 voting shareholders. 70
shareholders, by concentrating their ballots, to elect a proportional number
of board members.7' Shareholders have control over transactions that
involve the alienation of real property and assets.72 For deals involving
63 See BLACK ET AL., supra note I, at 9-13.

id.
65 Russian Company Law arts. 22-26. The Articles contain provisions dealing with convertible and
64

cumulative preferred shares, as well as the issuance of different classes of preferred shares, affecting
dividend payments and priority rights in liquidation. The Articles also list those situations in which holders
of preferred shares are automatically vested with voting rights at the general shareholders' meeting,
irrespective of any limitations imposed by a company's charter.
66 BLACK ET AL., supranote 1, at 9-10.
67 Russian Company Law art. 75.
68 id.
69 id. art. 76.
70 Id. art. 66. Article 66(4) provides for cumulative voting in companies with over 1000 holders of
common stock (smaller companies may provide for cumulative voting in their charters). Id
71 id.
72 Id. art. 78. Article 78 section I defines large-scale transactions as:
[A] transaction or several mutually-linked transactions connected with the acquisition or alienation
or possibility of alienation by the company directly or indirectly of property whose value comprises
more than 25% of the balance sheet value of the assets of the company on the date of the adoption of
the decision concerning the conclusion of such transactions, except for transactions concluded in the
process of the exercise of ordinary economic activity; a transaction or several mutually-linked
transactions connected with the issuance of common stock or preferred stock convertible into
common stock comprising more than 25% of common stock previously issued.
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assets valued at over fifty percent of the company's book value, a seventyfive percent vote of shareholders is required. 73 If the deal equals twenty-five
to fifty percent of book value, the unanimous consent of the board of
directors, or majority shareholder approval, is required. 74 The law also
allows for provisions in the charter of a joint stock company to authorize
preferential rights, so that existing shareholders may acquire shares of an
additional issue by open subscription in proportion to the number of shares
held by them.75
The most important shareholder protections enumerated in the law
include the following requirements:
* joint stock companies with 500 shareholders must employ an
76
independent share registrar;
" a company must maintain, publish and present specified
77
information to shareholders upon request;
" shareholder(s) owning at least two percent of voting shares in
the company are entitled to propose up to two agenda items at
78
each annual general meeting of shareholders;
" open joint stock companies must maintain a minimum number
79
of members of the board of directors;
" members of the board of directors are elected for one-year
terms rather than two, and are subject to recall. 80 The law also
prohibits the management of the company from constituting a
majority of the board. 81
The law also stipulates that members of the board of directors, the
general director, and the members of senior management are liable to
Id. art. 78.
Section 2 states that the board shall determine the value that is the subject of a large-scale transaction.
Id art. 78(2).
" id. art. 79.
74

id.

75 Id. art. 40.
76 Id. art. 44.
77 Id. arts. 89, 91.
78 Id. art. 53.

79 Id. art. 66. For companies with more than 1,000 holders of voting shares, there must
be no fewer than
seven board members; for companies with over 10,000 such shareholders the minimum number isnine. Id
so Id arts. 66 (specifying the one year term requirement), 48 (authorizing shareholders to recall
board members).
" Id. art. 66. Thus, quorums of the board with sole representation by management were outlawed. Id

art. 68 (requiring a majority of board members to be present in order to establish a quorum). This provision, at
least on paper, would take away a very powerful tool used extensively by managers to maintain control of the
firm prior to the passage of the law. See BLAsi & SHLEIFER, supra note 20, at 99-100.
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companies for losses attributable to their culpable actions (or inactions),
unless they voted against the action or were absent from corresponding
meetings. 8 Legal standing to sue these persons is vested in shareholder(s)83
the company.
owning one percent of the placed common shares of
Moreover, shareholders shall exert control over transactions in which board
members and their affiliates are personally interested.84 Transactions carried
out in violation of this set of rules may be declared void.85 The aggregate of
these rights and protections embodied within the Russian Company Law is,
at least, a partial realization of the novel "self-enforcing" model advocated
by Professors Black and Kraakman.
The Self-Enforcing Model

B.

Unfortunately, the recognition of these rights would be very difficult
given the insider domination of many firms and the general lack of regard
for minority shareholders. Black and Kraakman were well aware of the
obstacles. Contrasted against the role of corporate law in developed
economies, which "plays a relatively small, even 'trivial' role," the Russian
law was to be "a much more central tool for motivating managers and large
value rather than simply transfer wealth to
shareholders to create social
86
themselves from others."
This "self-enforcing" model contains five features as a means for
creating such "social value." First, restrictions and rights are enforced
through the activities of direct participants, as opposed to reliance upon the
courts or regulators. 87 Second, greater protection is accorded to minority

82

Russian Company Law art. 71.

3 Id
Russian Company Law articles 81-83 concern self-interested transactions. Article 81 defines
these transactions according to the pecuniary involvement of a member of the board of directors, person
holding office in other management bodies of the company, shareholder(s) holding jointly with their
affiliated person(s) 20% or more of the voting stock, or their spouses, parents, etc. Id art. 81.
Article 82 states that the aforementioned persons must inform the board of directors, audit commission
and the auditor of the company of conflicts of interest concerning: legal entities in which they possess 20% or
more of the voting stock; legal entities in whose management bodies they hold office; transactions known to
them to be concluded or proposed in which they may be deemed to be interested persons. Id art. 82.
Article 83 states that, for a company with over 1000 shareholders, a decision concerning the conclusion of
a self-interested transaction shall be adopted by the general meeting of holders of voting stock by a majority of
those present who are not interested, in the following instances: if the amount of payment and the value of the
property which is the subject of the transaction exceed 2%of the assets; if the transaction is the issuance of
voting stock in a quantity exceeding 2% of voting stock previously issued. Id art. 83.
% Id art. 84.
86 Black & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1914.
87 Id. at 1916.
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shareholders.8 8 This feature is meant to compensate for the high incidence
of insider domination.8 9 The third feature consists of procedural protections
for various types of transactions as a means of inducing interaction among
larger shareholders rather than setting forth flat prohibitions which would
probably not be recognized anyway. 9° The fourth feature provides bright9
line rules, rather than standards, to define proper and improper conduct. 1
These rules make it easier for investor-participants to be aware of improper
conduct that might otherwise fall into a gray area. Moreover, such rules
make it more difficult for corrupt judges or regulators to maneuver around
broad standards. Finally, the fifth feature provides for strong legal remedies,
assuming that most of the sanctions will not be enforced.92
Black and Kraakman believe that these features can "build legal
norms that managers and large shareholders will see as reasonable and
comply with voluntarily." 93 They argue that "some managers will comply
with the written law simply because it is both written and reasonable; some
will comply because their peers do; others will comply so as not to risk
embarrassing news stories." 94 Moreover, "companies that need capital will
comply with the rules to build a reputation for honest behavior, and
companies that plan to enter long-term contractual relations must safeguard
their reputation for honesty and fair dealing." 95 The rules should also make
it apparent once misconduct takes place. It is relatively simple to determine
whether a vote was taken or whether required information was provided to
shareholders.
Black and Kraakman hope that even "without official
enforcement, the entire corporate law... becomes a set of default rules from
which the participants in the corporate enterprise can depart, jointly or
unilaterally. But, as with any set
of default rules, it will be costly to ignore
96
them or contract around them."
The Russian Company Law incorporates several of Black and
Kraakman's features. The significant shareholder protections and rights
provided by the law to a considerable extent reflect the third and fourth
features discussed above. For example, the procedural protections over
certain transactions are reflected in the law's procedural requirements for
88 Id.
89 Id.

90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.

"
9'
95
96

Id. at 1917.
Id. at 1940.
Id.
Id.
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97
However, the law fails to
large-scale and self-interested transactions.
include bright-line rules to determine improper board member and officer
behavior. 98 Moreover, with regard to the first feature, it remains to be seen
whether the direct participants will enforce the various rights and restrictions
on their own or if they will have to resort to using the courts. With regard to
remedies, the Company Law provides for the complete compensation of any
loss to the company derived from an unauthorized self-interested transaction
for any
by the party involved. 99 However, Russian law fails to provide
00
law.
the
with
non-compliance
from
arising
sanctions
criminal

C.

Results of the Russian Company Law

The Russian Company Law has not effected a widespread recognition
of, or respect for, minority shareholder rights.' 0' The general lack of
compliance with the law appears to be a direct result of the managerial
domination in the majority of firms.' 0 2 General directors have been quite
successful in holding onto their control, as against rank-and-file employees
and outsider influences. 0 3 Those general managers who desire outside
investments have primarily accepted the Company Law.'0 4 The activities of
the Federal Securities Commission, along with several high-profile cases,
managed to thrust shareholder rights into the spotlight in early 1998.'0° Yet,
given the overall inadequate enforcement mechanisms, voluntary acceptance
to a greater
of the law by certain general managers has been the key
0
passed.'
was
law
the
since
rights
shareholders
of
recognition
Compliance with the Russian Company Law has been limited at
best.' 0 7 As of May 1997, two of the largest companies had not amended
their charters to comply with the law. ° 8 Recent news reports have described
97 See supra notes 73-74 (concerning large-scale transactions) and 84 (concerning self-interested
transactions) and accompanying text.

9s Russian Company Law art. 71 (defining the standard for board member or officer liability as

actions or inactions which are not in good faith and unreasonable).
99 Id art. 84. It also legally nullifies the transaction. Id.
100Dmitry Vasilyev, Press Conference with Federal Commission for the Securities Market, in OFFICIAL
KREMLIN INTL NEWS BROADCAST, Aug. 27, 1997, at 5, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Sovnws File.
:01 See infra pp. 14-17 and accompanying notes.
02 See infra pp. 17-18 and accompanying notes.
103See infra pp. 18-20 and accompanying notes.

:04See infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 114-123, & 168-170 and accompanying text.

'06See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
:07 See, e.g., infra note 112 and accompanying text.

" Boris Nemtsov, Press Conference with Boris Nemtsov, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT'L NEWS
BROADCAST, Apr. 28, 1997, at 9, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Sovnws File (relating how two oil

companies, RAO-UES and Gazprom, have not harmonized their charters with the Russian Company Law).

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 8 No. I

how the large oil companies in particular have attempted to abuse outsider
shareholders' rights.' 0 9 Almost ninety percent of foreign investors say that
companies failed to provide adequate financial, operational, and strategic
information to shareholders." 0 In 1997 alone, the Federal Securities
Commission stopped more than twenty attempts to dilute outsiders share
value."' Empirical research conducted in mid-1996 revealed widespread
illegal practices and prompted the researchers to rate corporate governance
2
standards in nearly sixty percent of firms as either "bad" or "horrible.""
Several recent incidents involving quarrels between outside investors and
management can help to illustrate non-compliance practices.
Recently, the Federal Commission for Securities Market publicly
censured the Russian management at Krasnodarsky Gips-KnaufAG, a
Russian-German joint venture. Although German nationals own fifty
percent of the common stock, management has denied them access to the
company's offices as well as access to any of its records.'' 3 One can see the
flagrant disregard for the law by some managers when they will not even
allow access to the actual owners, not to mention access to minority
shareholders.
One of the most dramatic examples, culminating in December 1997,
involved Novolipetsk Metallurgical Kombinat ("NLMK"), the country's
largest steel producer. The clash between investors and management arose
when Cambridge Capital Management, which owned twenty-five percent of
common stock, tried to nominate candidates to the board in January 1997.'14
The Russian Company Law allows shareholders with two percent of the
common stock to nominate candidates to the board. 15 However, NLMK
refused to recognize the submitted nominations even after the Federal
Commission on the Securities Market and the local prosecutor ordered
NLMK to comply. 116 Cambridge and another outside shareholder, Sputnik
109 See, e.g., Patricia Kranz, In Russia, a Rising Chorus: Enough is
Enough, Bus. WK. INT'L, Feb. 23,
1998, at 38 (describing how expected windfalls to investors arising from mergers actually diluted the value
of the investors' holdings). See also Christia Freeland, Investors Lose Audit Fight, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 7, 1998, at 2 (relating accusations by Western investors that Russian oil companies are siphoning
value from their oil production subsidiaries to the parent holding company).
'0Vincent Boland, Investor Confidence in Russia Improves, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 21, 1997, at 24
(relating a survey of U.S. investment institutions conducted by Brunswick Consultants, a New York firm).
11 Vasilyev, Press Conference with Federal Securities Commission Head, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN
INT'L NEWS BROADCAST, Jan. 28, 1998, at I, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Sovnws File.
112BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 201. Forty-six percent of the firms were rated "bad," 13% were
rated "horrible," whereas 39% were "good," and only 2% were "excellent."
3 Vasilyev, supra note 100, at 2.
114 See, e.g., All Sides Seek Protection of Shareholders' Rights in Novolipetsk Case, 8 Russ. &
COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP. 18, Jan. 14, 1998, at 12.
115 Russian Company Law art. 53.
16 All Sides Seek ProtectionofShareholders' Rights in Novolipetsk Case,supra note 114, at 12.
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Fund, went to court and received a favorable ruling in May 1997. 17 NLMK
not only ignored the ruling but held a general meeting of shareholders in
Eventually,
July without allowing an election for a new board.'"8
Cambridge and Sputnik, along with MFK-Renaissance Capital, acquired
enough common stock to prevent the passage of a new charter and even
voted in a majority of the board." 9
Another incident pitted Mosenergo, Moscow's electricity company,
The company
against foreign investors and the federal government.
proposed not only to limit shareholder voting rights to one percent of share
capital, regardless of the size of the shareholders' stake, but also to restrict
the nomination of directors to candidates with twenty-five years of
experience in the Russian power industry. 20 Moreover, the company
planned to sell another thirty percent of its shares to Moscow as a means of
diluting foreign ownership.' 1 Foreigners held an estimated thirty-five
percent of its shares owing, in part, to the company's reputation for
openness. 22 Mosenergo capitulated under pressure from the federal
government and threatened cancellation of a $100 23
million loan from the
European bank for Reconstruction and Development.
A quarrel involving the Lebedinsky Mining and Processing Plant did
not have a happy ending for investors. Clients of Rossinsky Kredit acquired
thirty percent of the plant but, after a series of quarrels, were barred from the
1996 annual general shareholders meeting at which the company diluted the
investors' shares to five percent. 124 The investors subsequently went to court,
got a favorable ruling, but could not enforce it.' 25 At the 1997 shareholder
meeting, the investors tried to submit candidates to the board (as in the
NLMK
26
case) but were not allowed to do so by the current board of directors.1
Non-compliance with the Russian Company Law may also be
attributed to ignorance and a dearth of professional support to implement
provisions. The cumulative voting protection for minority shareholders
117
Id.
.s Id. Annual elections for a new board are mandatory under Russian Company Law, art. 47.
Hence, NLMK managed to ignore another provision of the Russian Company Law. See Russian
Company Law art. 47.
.. All Sides Seek ProtectionofShareholders' Rights in Novolipetsk Case, supra note 114.
120See, e.g., Chrystia Freeland & Arkady Ostrovsky, Investor Fury at Russian Share Move, FIN.
TIMES (London), Apr. 17, 1997, at 3.
121id.
122id

:23 See, e.g., Chrystia Freeland, Mosenergo Forced to Give Way, FIN. TIMES (USA), Apr. 18, 1997, at 3.
124 See, e.g., Patricia Kranz, Shareholders at the Gate: Russian "Red Directors" Dig in Their Heels
as Outside Investors Try to Oust Them, BUS. WK.,June 2, 1997, at 60.
125Id
126 Id.
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dumbfounded one management team responsible for the annual shareholders
meeting. 127 They even went through the trouble of studying the law as well
as employing outside counsel. 128 The disclosure requirements established by
29
the Russian Company Law include independent annual audits.'
Unfortunately, accountants are in high demand; furthermore, asking
enterprises on the brink of survival to pay for an audit, which could expose
further weaknesses in the company or conversely invite higher tax liabilities,
is probably too much to expect. Likewise, many companies simply lack
mechanisms for disseminating such information.' 3 0 Moreover, although
there were several articles in the Russian media discussing the passage of the
Company Law, official dissemination of the law was non-existent.'31
Despite the publicized incidents, some blue-chip companies are
moving to comply with the law as a default mechanism to protect
shareholder rights in the hopes of attracting foreign investment. Insiders at
Sidanco, a Russian oil company, had previously agreed to dilute minority
shareholder stakes through a closed convertible bond issue. 132 After
aggrieved shareholders called the Federal Securities Commission into action
against the issuance, insiders are now planning to offer minority
shareholders "equal access" to the bonds. 133 Mr. Vladimir Potantin, one of
the most powerful business magnates in Russia, and director of Sidanco, said
' 34
that in Russia today "it is not possible not to respect shareholder rights."'
Another powerful oil company, Yuksi, was also alleged to have mistreated
35
minority investors by diluting shareholder value through asset stripping.'
Yuksi has decided to resolve the incident by establishing an international
board of western consultants to create a "charter" as a means to protect
minority shareholder rights. 136 Gazprom, yet another large oil company, has
promised to become more transparent and open in the hopes of attracting
foreign investors. '37
:27 Kathryn Hendley, Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia, 13 POST-SOVIET AFF. 228, 238 (1997).
228

Id

29 Russian Company Law art. 88.
230 See Gregory L. White, Lukoil's Unofficial Release of Earnings Highlights Bugs in the Russian
Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 11810430.
131 Telephone interview with Valvio Musim, Professor of Law, St. Petersburg State University
(Mar. 21, 1998).
232 Chrystia Freeland, Shareholders Win Russian Bond Fight, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 26, 1998, at 2.
233 Id
134 Id
' Matthew Brzezinski, Western Investors Cheer Russian Ruling That Upholds Minority Holder
Rights, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1998, at A-17.
:36 Chrystia Freeland, Russian Oil Group Hits Back at Critics, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 19, 1998, at 27.
237 Do, Kapital, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1996, at A-22. Seven months later Gazprom had complied

with the cumulative voting requirement although it still had the reputation for being "notoriously
secretive." Steve Liesman, Outsiders at Russia's RAO Gazprom Vie for Crucial First Seat on Firm's
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In short, compliance with the law has been haphazard at best.
Scandals over shareholder rights continue to rock Russian security
exchanges. 38 Although larger companies are moving toward greater
compliance, smaller companies tend to be more concerned about tight
insider control.139 Managers are willing to comply only when they realize
they need outsider money. 140 This attitude will be explored more fully,
along with other factors that would tend to explain the lack of widespread
compliance, in the next section.
An Explanation of the Results of the Russian Company Law

D.

Several factors tend to explain the lack of widespread compliance
the
law. The largest obstacle remains the influence and attitude of the
with
absolute. 142
general directors.141 In most firms, their control is virtually
They have successfully undermined the governance rights of the rank-andfile workers who generally own the greatest aggregate of shares. General
directors see the law and outside investors as a threat to their control' 43 and
outsiders have been active in attempting to assert their rights.144 Moreover,
the courts and the Federal Securities Commission have earned
45 a respectable
reputation for their acts on behalf of minority shareholders.
One analyst for the Moscow Times proclaimed, "The record shows
that Russian corporate chieftains care as much about shareholder rights as
they do about Uruguayan agrarian reform, and their propensity will not
change anytime soon.", 4 6 This propensity stems from a desire to maintain
Compliance with the law would
personal control over the firm.'
Board, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1997, at A- 18.
138See, e.g., Kranz, supra note 109 (relating how a spate of scandals helped bring the Moscow
exchange down by some 30% in January 1998).
139 Paula Hawkins, Salomon Gets Serious, 7 CENTRAL EUR. 44, 44-45 (1997) (containing excerpts
from an interview with Jim Dannis, Managing Director for Emerging Markets with Salomon Bros., wherein
he states that there are two tiers of companies. The first tier is concerned with attracting investments and
exhibits "no major corporate governance challenges." The second seeks to remain closed and works with
closely affiliated "banks or trade suppliers.").
140 In mid-1996, only 29% of senior managers in a survey said that they would sell ownership
over
the firm to an outsider if that investor would make all the capital investment necessary to restructure the
firm. See BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 201.
141 Gary Peach, Financial Ethics Crackdown Bodes Well for Shareholders, Moscow TIMES, Feb. 24,
1998, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Mostms File. See also Hendley, supra note 127, at 243.
142 Hendley, supra note 127, at 243.
143

id

Brzezinski, supra note 135, at A-17.
'45 Chrystia Freeland, Scourge of Moscow's Moguls, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 27, 1998, at 2.
146Peach, supra note 141.
147 Id
!44
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necessitate a loosening of personal control by following provisions that may
not be responsive to management's interests.
For example, in principle the use of cumulative voting, independent
auditors, and counting commissions wrests control from management.
Cumulative voting is meant to lead to greater outsider representation on the
board of directors, 148 which has the power to terminate the general director
and other managers. 149 Likewise, the auditors and counting commission are
accountable to the shareholders and not the management. 150 Such provisions
diminish the general director's authority. Thus, general directors who are
primarily interesting in retaining control over "their" firms would be
unlikely to comply with many of the provisions in the law.
One of the greatest problems faced by minority shareholders is the
lack of adequate disclosure of financial information.' 51 Such disclosure is
mandated in Article 92 of the law. However, many general directors have
been fearful to expose such information. 152 The reason general directors
may be loathe to disclose such information is that such disclosure may
expose violations of other provisions.153 Indeed, Professor Black has stated
"greater disclosure of corporate dealings will ultimately prove the key tool in
wiping-out shareholder-rights violations. Sunshine has proved to be a great
disinfectant in American companies . . ' .54It will prove to be effective in
Russia, too, if given a chance to operate."'
Not only do general directors lose a measure of control by complying
with the law, compliance demands a shift in engrained behavior patterns and
attitudes towards the role of law. The rules, which the Russian Company
Law mandates, are quite alien and not a reflection of Soviet customs.
Directors of enterprises in Soviet times relied largely on personal contacts
rather than the rules of laws as a means to promote their interests and resolve
5 6
disputes. 155 This engrained behavior will likely take years to overcome.
Moreover, Russians have consistently seen the laws used as a "sword
57
brandished by the state" rather than as a "shield to protect society."',
See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
49 See Russian Company Law art. 65 (10).
o50
Id art. 48. Furthermore, management is strictly barred from representation in these bodies. See,

:49

id, art. 85 (6) (concerning the auditors); art. 56 (2) (concerning the counting commission).
S52See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
152 BLASI ET AL., supra note 2, at 98, 200.
153 See, e.g., supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
54 Jeanne Whalen, Shareholders Rights: Round 2, MOSCOW TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1998, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Mostms File.
:53 Hendley, supranote 127, at 240-41.
56 Id at 242.
117 Id at 237.
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Currently, "[e]conomic actors do not view law as being useful to them, as a
mechanism either to advance their interests or to defend themselves from
arbitrary acts by the state." 158 These attitudes and engrained behavioral
patterns would tend to explain the inconsistency between current business
practices and compliance with the law.
Rank-and-file employees have had a difficult time exerting control
over the firms. As of mid-1996, these workers actually held controlling
stakes in the vast majority of insider-controlled firms, 159 yet for the most part
they have been hapless in asserting their rights. 160 One reason for this is the
weakness of the organization among the workers through their labor
unions.1 61 Another reason is fear of losing their jobs if they would attempt
to vote against management in shareholders meetings. 162 Yet another
explanation is the historical respect for the head official: "[t]heir instinct was
to obey orders, not to question [management's] legitimacy."' 163 In short,
rank-and-file employees have not, in general, asserted their rights to the
extent they could under the Company Law.
Conversely, both domestic and foreign investors have been quite
active in trying to assert their rights. Yet, given the overall compliance with
the law among firms, the extent to which these outside investors have
effected changes in respect for shareholders' rights have been limited to
those firms interested in attracting investors. 64 The Financial Industrial
Groups ("FIGs") have been quite effective in corporate restructuring and are
considered "key players in Russia's economic game.' 65 Yet, their impact
on the overall economy as a whole is very small. 166 These outside investors
have been somewhat successful in attempting to assert their rights, and yet,
this trend is not widespread.
A further explanation for the lack of compliance is reflected in the
weakness of enforcement mechanisms, namely, the courts and the Federal
Securities Commission. The Federal Securities Commission is the federal
"' Id.at 239.
159BLASI ET AL., supranote 2, at 193.
'60Id.at 113.
16' Labor unions were not, during the Soviet regime, meant to exercise worker rights. Now, most
are managerially controlled and thus do not assert themselves against the dictates of the general
director. Id. at 107-08.
161Id.at 107. But see Kathryn Hendley, Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a
Russian Enterprise, 50 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 91, 95 (1998).
163Kathryn Hendley, supra note 162, at 95.
:64Hawkins, supra note 139, at 44-45.
65 U.S. Embassy Report, Demystifying Russian FIGs: Banker Barons Versus Industry-Led Financial
Groups (visited Mar. 22, 1998) <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/cables/cable.htm>. There are two types
of FIGs: bank ledand industry led (holding companies). Id
166id.
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agency delegated with the task of protecting shareholders rights. 167 Recently,
it has been praised for taking on large companies on behalf of investors.16
Such acts have signaled a new "avenue of activity" towards regulating
enterprises as it has previously focused on licensing registrars and registering
emission prospectuses. 169 Unfortunately, the commission can only apply
pressure to firms and refer abuses to the civil arbitration courts, as it has no
power to issue fines or bring criminal charges for violations of the law. 17 0 The
courts themselves are in the process of overcoming a bad reputation.
Foreigners have been concerned about a court's ability to make "independent,
even-handed" decisions. 171
Many Russian businessmen believe that
submitting disputes to these courts is a waste of time. 172 Even with a favorable
73
judgement, it can be extremely difficult to ensure its satisfaction.1
E.

CorporateGovernance andSelf-Enforcement in Russia

Although there are widespread and deeply rooted problems with
corporate governance practices in Russia, the Russian Company Law has
already realized some of the aspirations of its designers. The realization of
these aspirations can be overshadowed by comparisons with corporate
governance standards in the West. Largely, the "self-enforcing model" has
not lived up to its name. However, the Company Law was introduced into a
very hostile environment of unflinching managerial control over most
privatized firms and an extremely weak legal culture. The small successes
over the last two years should not be underestimated.
Some of the central features of the self-enforcing model have led
directly to these small successes. In fact, there is presently a tier of
companies that exhibit "no major corporate governance challenges."' 174 This
signifies a dramatic departure from the prevalent conditions surveyed just
before the law was passed. 175 The departure is directly correlated to the
:67 Freeland, supra note 145, at 2.
:68 See Peach, supra note 139.
69Vasilyev, supra note 100, at 5.
70 Id at 5. The name of the courts does not mean to imply that these courts actually arbitrate
disputes, rather, these courts were transformed from Soviet tribunals of the same name. See, Hendley,
supra note 127, at 239 n. 27.
171 Survey-Moscow as a Business Centre: Risk-reward Balance is Shifting,
FIN. TIMES, Sep. 17,
1997, at 9.
:72 Hendley, supra note 127, at 237-39.
173 id.at 241-42. See also, Survey-Moscow as a Business Centre: Risk-reward Balance is Shifting,
supra note 171.
" 4 See Hawkins, supra note 139 (quoting a foreign
investor's perceptions).
17 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (scoring only 2% of companies as exhibiting
"excellent" standards of corporate governance).
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176
voluntary compliance of the managers as a means to attract investors.
Moreover, once these investors become active they are able to enjoy
substantial governance rights provided by the law. As such, the departure
corresponds to the central features of the law emphasizing strong
shareholder rights and the hope that the market participants would
voluntarily comply with the law. 17
Unfortunately, the hostile environment remains by which many
general directors with absolute control over their firm do not wish to
relinquish their control. Legal incentives can only become tangible if these
Protections for minority
directors wish to attract outside investors.
from the majority
control
of
a
diminution
necessitate
shareholders
voting and
cumulative
as
such
protections
example,
For
shareholders.
independent registrars hamper the majority shareholders' ability to vote in
an entire board or to disguise true share ownership in order to retain tight
control. General directors whose primary concern is to maintain maximum
control have little incentive to comply with the law. The lack of large
outside investors and the weakness of the state as a regulator only exacerbate
this fundamental problem.
As the capital markets in Russia develop, more powerful outside
investors will become more significant equity participants in Russian jointstock companies. They will seek undervalued companies and attempt to invest
in them. One likely outcome is that general directors will become attracted to
the much-needed capital these investors have to offer. If this attraction can
overcome a director's fear over the loss of absolute control and if outside
investors become large, possibly even majority shareholders, then a director
would seek refuge in the law's minority shareholder protections. At such a
point, the directors themselves may become the strongest supporters of the law
as a means to protect themselves as minority shareholders.
Moreover, the enforcement mechanisms have been improving.
Several court cases, including the NMLK and the Monsenergo cases, have
developed important precedents for future violations of rights. 178 The
Federal Securities Commission ("FSC") has also recently become quite
active, not to mention successful, as a protector for minority shareholders'
interests. 79 Last year alone, the FSC denied twenty emission prospectuses

'76 See Hawkins, supranote 139, at 44-45.
177 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1939.
178 See supra notes 11-123 and accompanying text. See also, Chris Plath, Shareholder Victories
Move Russia One Step Closer to Good Corporate Governance, CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. May-June
1997, at 26, (1997).
179 See supranotes 167-170 and accompanying text.
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that would have led to share dilutions.1 80 The press and international
agencies have also been successful in exerting pressure.
Although these
"indirect" participants were not the locus from which rights were to be
protected, their positive involvement would have diminished but for the
law's strong protections highlighting the illegality of the acts in question.
Overall, the Russian Company Law has been moderately successful
given the difficult circumstances posed by the Russian environment. It has
been a valuable tool for effectuating better corporate governance. Yet, not
until more general directors desire outside investors will widespread
conditions for compliance become ripe.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Russian economy has experienced rapid and dramatic changes
since the onset of privatization in late 1992. The governing structures of the
privatized firms have been the key to effectuating much needed restructuring
in order to make these firms more efficient and profitable. Yet, the
privatization process led directly to insider domination in the great majority of
these firms. This insider domination, in turn, led to widespread abuses, such
as blatant theft of corporate assets and the mistreatment of other investors.
Many of the general directors were more concerned with exercising control
and safeguarding their positions than the realities of the market. The Russian
Company Law was introduced as a means for those market participants
interested in profits to realize their goals. The features and protections of this
law make it a novelty. Its early successes in the wake of extremely hostile
conditions provide hope for Russia, and make it a model for states and
observers interested in legal reform in emerging capitalist markets.
It has not even been three years since the law was passed. Given the
prevalent corporate governance conditions existing at the time of its
promulgation, the law has managed to promote some modest improvements.
These improvements are attributable to the features inherent within the law.
As such, the designers of the law can be satisfied that they have laid the
legal framework for probable future gains in Russia's corporate governance
standards.

:S0Vasilyev, supranote 100, at 5.

See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing the role of the EBRD
as a factor in the
resolution ofthe.Monsenergo case).
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